We study N -player continuous-time Cournot games in an oligopoly where firms choose production quantities. These are nonzero-sum differential games, whose value functions may be characterized by systems of nonlinear Hamilton-Jacobi partial differential equations. When resources are in finite supply, such as oil, exhaustibility enters as boundary conditions for the PDEs. We analyze the problem when there is an alternative, but expensive, technology (for example solar power for energy production), and give an asymptotic approximation in the limit of small exhaustibility. We illustrate the two-player problem by numerical solutions, and discuss the impact of limited oil reserves on production and oil prices in the duopoly case.
Introduction
The problem of dwindling oil reserves and its impact on energy supply and prices is of longstanding importance. One way to analyze the issues is to view energy markets as being governed by a small number of competitive firms or countries, that is as oligopolies, and to model the formation of prices and supplies within this competitive framework. Game theory provides a natural way to frame the outcome of competition within different choices of market mechanism. Exhaustibility, meanwhile, requires analysis of how anticipation of changing resources impacts production and prices, and therefore leads to dynamic games. Here we study continuous-time (or differential) games arising from competition over a resource in limited supply. The games are nonzero-sum as all players act to maximize their own profits.
Typical models of industrial organization in the economics literature are restricted to the study of one or two-period games. For ordinary and stochastic zero-sum differential games, there is a fairly general theory [7, 12] , including a viscosity theory for their associated (scalar) Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs PDEs. In the nonzero-sum case where systems of equations for the value functions of all the players arise, there is, to our knowledge, no similar general theory. Some recent books that discuss nonzero-sum deterministic and stochastic differential games are [1, 6] . There is also a literature on exhaustibility (or capacity constraints), but not, primarily, in the context of continuous-time models. We mention [5] as a reference for the literature on exhaustible resources up through the 1970s.
When the quantity being produced is in finite supply, such as oil, exhaustibility is a "game-changer", and enters as boundary conditions for the PDEs. We analyze the problem when there is an alternative resource (for example solar technology for energy production), which is inexhaustible, but much more costly to produce than extracting oil. Of interest is the impact on oil extraction rates, and hence market prices, as reserves run out and energy production must switch to more expensive renewable sources.
We begin by analysing the static N-player Cournot game as a function of the costs of production of the firms. When we move to the dynamic problem in Section 3, exhaustibility acts like a varying cost, that depends on the dynamic game's value functions, in a static game at the infinitesimal level. Therefore, we devote some effort in Section 2 to establish existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for the static game with players who have different costs. The static game equilibrium production and profit functions are essential ingredients for the partial differential equations characterizing the dynamic game in Section 3. In Section 4, we derive a perturbation approximation for the case when the cost of the alternative technology is small. Section 5 studies in detail and with numerical PDE solutions a specific two-player example. In particular, we discuss the issue of one firm being blockaded out of competition by the dominance of the other. Section 6 concludes.
Static Cournot Game
In the bulk of the paper we will analyse a dynamic version of the Cournot model of competition: producers of the resource set quantities which they bring to the market, and the price is then determined from the total quantity produced. Before moving to the dynamic game with exhaustibility, we analyze the static (one-period, or stage) game and introduce notation from it that will be needed later.
We take as given a price (or inverse-demand) function P : (0, ∞) → R that gives market price (per unit) as a function of quantity produced and put on the market. There are N ≥ 1 players. Each player i chooses a quantity q i ∈ [0, ∞) to produce at unit cost of production a i ≥ 0, and the market price is determined from the total production. In the original example described by Cournot [4] , the inexhaustible resource being produced was mineral water.
Once each player chooses his quantity, the market price is given by
The profit of player i is the quantity he produces multiplied by price minus cost:
where Q −i = j =i q j is total production by the players other than i. We allow for the possibility that P (0 + ) = +∞, but specify π(q i , Q −i , a i ) = 0 when q i = 0: if a player does not produce anything, then he makes no profit.
Each player seeks to maximize his own profit, taking the quantities produced by the other players as given. More precisely: 
where Q Assumption 2.2. The price function P is twice continuously differentiable, with P ′ < 0 everywhere on (0, ∞); and there exists η ∈ (0, ∞) such that P (η) = 0.
The first part of this assumption is natural: the greater total production, the less the market will be willing to pay per unit. The second part implies that P (Q) < 0 for Q > η: if there is over-production, players have to pay to have the surplus removed. Nonetheless, it should be noted that negative prices will play no role in our analysis, because profitmaximizing players with positive costs will never produce at a level at which prices are negative. We shall refer to η as the saturation point.
We order the firms by their costs and assume they are strictly less than the choke price
When some firms have equal costs, the ordering is arbitrary and does not affect the analysis that follows. The assumption that a i < P (0 + ) for all i ensures that, in any Nash equilibrium q * , total production Q * = N i=1 q * i will be strictly positive, for if all players other than i produce nothing, so that q j = 0 for all j = i, then player i can make a strictly positive profit q i (P (q i ) − a i ) by producing a small positive amount q i (and may be able to do much better). Having all players produce nothing is therefore not a Nash equilibrium. The assumption that a i ≥ 0 for all i ensures that P (Q * ) > 0. In particular, Q * < η. The behaviour of P is best characterized in terms of the relative prudence of P , namely
Our terminology here is adapted from [13] . 1 We also define ρ = sup
We turn now to the detailed analysis of Nash equilibrium, first for general price functions P , and then, in Section 2.2, for a convenient family of examples which are amenable to explicit calculations.
General Price Functions
Suppose that q * is an interior Nash equilibrium. Then, for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, q * i must satisfy the first-order condition
1 The relationship between the definition (4) of relative prudence and the usual definition in economics involving the third derivative of a utility function can be understood as follows. Suppose that a consumer has quasilinear utility function u(Q) + m, where Q is the quantity consumed and m is money. Then her inverse demand function is u ′ (Q) and her coefficient of relative prudence is ρ(
. Putting u ′ (Q) = P (Q) in this latter formula, we recover (4). That is, our ρ is in fact the relative prudence of u in the usual sense. Another example in which relative prudence plays a role in establishing the uniqueness of equilibrium in a game-theoretic setting is [11] .
Summing over i, we obtain
where
is total production and A N = N i=1 a i is the sum of the unit costs. In other words, Q * must satisfy the scalar equation f N (Q) = A N , where
On the other hand, given a solution of this equation, making q * i the subject of equation (6), a candidate Nash equilibrium is
Using (7), we can also express the candidate equilibrium quantities in (8) as
This has the interpretation that, once the equilibrium total quantity Q * is determined, the fraction produced by player i is the deviation of his cost a i from the market price P (Q * ) relative to the total deviation of all players' costs from the price.
However, some q * i defined by (8) may be negative, and so we must also consider Nash equilibria in which some players do not produce. For 1 ≤ n ≤ N, we define
and A n = n i=1 a i . We then have the following lemma. Lemma 2.3. Fix n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, and suppose that ρ < n + 1. Then there is a unique Q * n ∈ (0, η) such that f n (Q * n ) = A n . Proof. It is sufficient to show that f n is decreasing with f n (0 + ) > A n and f n (η) < 0, so there is a unique root of f n (Q) = A n in (0, η). We compute
Hence f ′ n < 0 on (0, ∞). We also have f n (η) = ηP ′ (η) < 0 (since P (η) = 0). We therefore need only show that f n (0 + ) > A n . In the case where P (0 + ) is finite and P ′ (0 + ) exists and is finite, f n (0
The case where the choke price is infinite (P (0 + ) = +∞) is a little more involved, and is handled in the appendix.
Then, for each n > max(0, ρ − 1), we have the following n-player candidate Nash equilibrium:
where Q * n is the unique solution of f n (Q) = A n , and we recall that the players are ordered by their production costs a i . This candidate equilibrium can fail to be a Nash equilibrium of the game as a whole in one of three ways:
1. it may happen that q * i < 0 for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n; 2. it may happen that a i < P (Q * n ) for some n + 1 ≤ i ≤ N; or 3. it may happen that, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, q * i is not a global maximum of π(·, Q −i , a i ). The first case occurs if and only if a i > P (Q * n ), that is, the unit cost of player i is greater than or equal to the market price and player i would be better off not producing anything.
In other words, we should look for a Nash equilibrium with a smaller number n ′ < n of active players. This is only possible if ρ satisfies the stricter inequality ρ < n ′ . In the second case, the unit cost of player i is less than the market price and player i would therefore be better off participating by producing some q * i > 0. In other words, we should look for a Nash equilibrium with a larger number n ′′ > n of active players. In the third case, player i will want to deviate from the candidate equilibrium, and it is not clear where we should look for an alternative equilibrium. This third possibility can be eliminated by a hypothesis on P , namely that ρ < 2.
Lemma 2.4. Suppose that ρ < 2 and
Proof. As P (0 + ) may not be finite, the details of the proof depend on whether Q −i > 0 or
is twice continuously differentiable everywhere, and in particular at q i = 0. Moreover, for q i ≥ 0,
Hence g has a unique global maximum, which is attained in [0, η) since g(0) = 0 and g(q i ) < 0 for q i ≥ η. In the case Q −i = 0,
In particular, g(q i ) may be discontinuous at q i = 0. As a i < P (0 + ) by assumption, P −1 (a i ) ∈ (0, η] exists and is unique, and g > 0 on (0, P −1 (a i )). Consequently, g(0
It follows from the calculations in the proof of Lemma 2.3 that
for all q i > 0. Thus since g < 0 for q > P −1 (a i ), g has a unique global maximum, which is attained in (0,
The assumption that ρ < 2 does more than simply eliminate the possibility of competing local maxima: it allows us to implement the approach to characterizing equilibria sketched above. Starting from the one-player equilibrium with player one, who has the lowest cost, we look at whether player two, who has the second lowest cost, wants to participate, in other words if his cost is less than the one-player market price: a 2 < P (Q * 1 ). If so, we ask if both the first two players want to participate in the two-player equilibrium, and so on. The following lemma establishes the crucial step.
Lemma 2.5. Suppose for some n < N, we have n-and (n + 1)-player candidate equilibria with aggregate production quantities Q * n and Q * n+1 respectively, and the individual production levels given by (11) with the appropriate Q * . Then player n+1 will want to participate in the n-player equilibrium if and only if he wants to participate in the (n + 1)-player equilibrium.
Proof. From (11), player i participates in an n-player candidate equilibrium if and only if a i < P (Q * n ). Recall from Lemma 2.3 that each Q * n ∈ (0, η) satisfies f n (Q * n ) = A n , where the functions f n (Q) were defined in (9) , and are decreasing on (0, η). For 1 ≤ n < N, it is straightforward to see that f n+1 (Q * n ) = A n − P (Q * n ), and therefore
Similarly,
Then (14) , and the conclusion follows.
Proposition 2.6. Suppose that ρ < 2. Then there is a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If ρ < 2, then Q * n is well-defined for all 1 ≤ n ≤ N. Now, it is obvious that the single player in the one-player candidate equilibrium will not wish to leave this equilibrium. Suppose for n < N, we have a Nash equilibrium in which the first n players participate with positive production. If a n+1 < P (Q * n ), then, from Lemma 2.5, player n + 1 wishes to enter, and he will participate in the (n + 1)-player equilibrium, as will the other n players since their costs are lower than or equal to his. Therefore every candidate equilibrium with n or fewer players is overturned by entry. We can proceed adding players until either (i) no further players wish to enter; or (ii) there are no further players, and therefore we have uniqueness.
We note that even if we have the case that a n+1 = a n+2 = · · · = a n+k for some k > 1, it is sufficient just to keep adding the players with equal costs one-by-one in any order. It is clear that if player n + 1 wishes to enter, then so will players n + 2 through n + k, but it suffices to carry out the argument in unit increments. Proposition 2.6 also shows that as players wish to join candidate equilibria, the sequence {Q * n | 1 ≤ n ≤ N} is first strictly increasing:
for some 1 ≤ n 1 < n 2 ≤ N if and only if (i) player n 1 + 1 is exactly indifferent between entering and remaining out of the n 1 -player candidate equilibrium; and (ii) a n 1 +1 = ... = a n 2 . Finally, if there is an n ′ < N where a n ′ +1 ≥ P (Q * n ′ ) so that the remaining players after n ′ are costed out of participating in any Nash equilibrium, then Q * n ′ +1 ≥ Q * n ′ , and the sequence (Q * n ) is non-increasing thereafter, and strictly decreasing once some a n+1 > P (Q * n ). When a Nash equilibrium exists and is unique, we denote the equilibrium production of player i as a function of the vector of costs a = (a 1 , a 2 , ..., a N ) by q * i (a), and the equilibrium profit of player i by
where Q * −i (a) = j =i q * j (a). The functions q * i and G i are essential building blocks in the system of PDEs in Section 3. We have the following corollary.
Corollary 2.7. Suppose that ρ < 2. Then the unique Nash equilibrium can be constructed as follows. LetQ
Then the unique Nash equilibrium quantities are given by
and the corresponding profits are
In particular, q * i and G i are Lipschitz continuous, and the number of active players in the unique equilibrium is m = min n | Q * n =Q * .
Lipschitz continuity follows from the fact that q * i and G i are constructed from compositions of C 1 functions and max operations. Notice that kinks occur in the q * i and G i only when a j = P Q * for some j, that is, when player j is exactly indifferent between participating or not. Or, to put the same point another way, the q * i and G i are as smooth as P ′ on any region of unit-cost space [0, P (0 + )) N on which the set {i | q * i (a) > 0} of active players is constant.
Example: Constant Prudence Price Curves
In this section we present formulae for Nash equilibria under a tractable family of price functions for which the relative prudence ρ, defined in (4), is constant. In this case, P satisfies the second-order ordinary differential equation Q P ′′ + ρP ′ = 0. The most natural choices for the two constants of integration are the saturation point η > 0, and the slope at the saturation point, −ζ < 0. With these choices, we have P (Q) = −ζηC Q η , where
is the canonical solution with η = ζ = 1. However, the only role for the constant ζ is to translate the units in which P is measured into the units in which a is measured, so we set ζ = 1. This leaves us with
For ρ < 1, the choke price P (0 + ) = η/(1 − ρ) is finite. For ρ ≥ 1, the choke price is infinite. On (0, η], the pricing curve is convex for ρ > 0, affine for ρ = 0, and concave for ρ < 0.
As in the general case, we work with the functions f n (Q) = QP ′ (Q) + nP (Q), but now we have much more precise information about these functions. We define
where ⌊ρ⌋ denotes the largest integer less than or equal to ρ.
Lemma 2.8. There is no Nash equilibrium for
Proof. For the specific functional forms arising when ρ is constant, we have
Hence, when ρ > 1 and n ≤ ρ − 1 < ⌊ρ⌋, then f n < 0 on (0, η), and there is no solution Q * n to the equation
We can then prove existence by starting from the n ρ -player candidate equilibrium and adding players until either (i) no further players wish to enter; or (ii) there are no further players. Of course, we must assume that ρ < N + 1, for otherwise there is no n ≤ N for which an n-player candidate equilibrium exists.
The only real obstacle to this program is the possibility that, in an n -player candidate equilibrium, the production level q i of player i is not the global maximum of π(·, Q −i , a i ). Since the case ρ < 2 is already covered by Lemma 2.4, we can restrict attention to the case in which ρ ≥ 2. Moreover, if Q −i were to vanish for some i in an n-player candidate equilibrium that was feasible in all other respects, then that candidate equilibrium would also be a oneplayer candidate equilibrium; and if ρ ≥ 2 then there are no one-player candidate equilibria. We can therefore further restrict attention to the case Q −i > 0.
Lemma 2.9. Suppose that 2 ≤ ρ < N + 1, and
Proof. Now g(0) = 0 and g(q i ) < 0 for all q i ∈ [η, ∞), so g has a global maximum attained in [0, η] . From (12), we have
for all q i ∈ [0, ∞). There are then two cases to consider. First, if ρ = 2, then g ′′ < 0 everywhere on [0, ∞), and so g has a global maximum attained in [0, η). Second, if ρ > 2, then g ′′ < 0 on 0,
and g ′′ > 0 on
, ∞ and g is bounded above, we must have g ′ < 0 on
, ∞ , and uniqueness follows.
Proposition 2.10. Suppose that ρ < N + 1. Then there is a unique Nash equilibrium given as follows:
The corresponding profits are
G i (a) = q * i (a)(P − a i ). In particular, q * i
and G i are Lipschitz continuous, and the number of active players in the unique equilibrium is
Proof. For the constant prudence price curves, the formulas are best expressed in terms of the equilibrium prices. By direct calculation, for each n ρ ≤ n ≤ N, the unique solution to f n (Q) = A n is given by
The candidate n-player equilibria are
We prove existence and uniqueness as in Proposition 2.6. The only difference is that we now confine attention to n ρ ≤ n ≤ N. We start with the n ρ -player candidate equilibrium. If n ρ = 1, then it is obvious player one will wish to make profit and not leave. If n ρ > 1, then 0 < n ρ + 1 − ρ ≤ 1 and the candidate price P nρ is guaranteed to exceed the cost of player n ρ :
That is, player n ρ (and therefore all players i < n ρ ) will not want to leave the n ρ -player candidate equilibrium. Then Lemma 2.5, Proposition 2.6 and Corollary 2.7 hold as in the general case, except we no longer need the restrictionρ < 2 to guarantee unique global maxima. It remains to characterize the transition point where players stop entering the game. As in Corollary 2.7, this occurs when the equilibrium aggregate production level Q * n first becomes non-increasing, or we reach the maximum number of players N. This is equivalent to when the candidate prices P n first become non-decreasing or we reach N, and hence the Nash equilibrium price is given byP .
As in the general case, kinks occur in the q * i and G i only when a j = P Q for some j, that is when player j is exactly indifferent between producing or not. Moreover the q * i
and G i are as smooth as P ′ on any region of unit-cost space [0, P (0 + )) N on which the set {i | q * i (a) > 0} of active players is constant.
Remark 2.11. We note that the general formula for P n (obtained without setting ζ = 1) is (A n +ζ η)/(n+1−ρ), which resolves the seemingly inconsistent dimensions in the numerator of (17).
Remark 2.12.
There is an even more explicit characterization of m. Consider the function h given by the formula h(n) = η + A n−1 − (n − ρ) a n . The requirement that a 1 < P (0
In the numerical solutions in Section 5.3, we shall use the linear price function corresponding to ρ = 0, that is, P (Q) = η − Q. In this case, the market price is
the quantity produced by player i is q * i (a) = max P − a i , 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N; and the profit of player i is
2 . Alternatively, in terms of the number of active players m = min{1 ≤ n ≤ N | P n =P }, we have
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and q * i = G i = 0 for i > m. Finally, we mention that ordering of the players by costs is, of course, not crucial to defining the functions q * i and G i in this section. Given a general costs vector, the constructions above are simply modified to first temporarily relabel the firms according to their costs, compute the Nash equilibrium as above, and then return the equilibrium quantities and profits in the original labelling order.
Differential Game & Exhaustibility
We now introduce the dynamic Cournot game under exhaustibility constraints. Each player i has reserves of a traditional and cheap-to-produce resource (for example oil, by extraction), denoted by x i (t) at time t ≥ 0. We take for simplicity the cost of production from this source to be zero, but reserves are finite (exhaustible). There is also an alternative source that is inexhaustible, but expensive-to-produce (solar power in the energy example), with constant unit cost of production c ∈ [0, P (0 + )). Player i chooses a dynamic production rateq i that is a Markov strategy:
, where x(t) = (x 1 (t), · · · , x N (t)). As long as x i > 0, player i has the choice between producing from the cheap or expensive sources. After x i hits zero, he can only produce from the costlier alternative, which never runs out. We shall suppose, at first, that no player produces from the more expensive source as long as the cheaper one is available, 3 and we will discuss how this could be validated a posteriori. Therefore, reserves of his traditional resource deplete according to
(To lighten the notation, we do not denote the dependence of x on theq i .)
The market price is governed by a Cournot competition with the price function P as before, satisfying Assumption 2.2. We assume that, given a cost vector a satisfying (3), there is a unique Nash equilibrium q * (a) of the static Cournot game. Some general conditions for this were given in Proposition 2.6, and, for a specific family of price functions, in Proposition 2.10.
Dynamic Cournot Competition
Given initial reserves x i (0) ≥ 0, player i wants to maximize his discounted lifetime profit
where 1I denotes the indicator function, r > 0 is a discount rate, the profit function π was defined in (1), andQ −i = j =iq j . Note that the cost of production rises from zero to c when reserves x i run out, as denoted in the third argument of π in the integral. We look for a Markov Perfect Nash equilibriumq
N (x(t))) such that, for each player i, and each initial state x(0),q * i is the best response when all the other players play their equilibrium strategies. Therefore, with the notationQ
for any Markov strategyq i of player i, and for all
The requirement that the equilibrium strategies are independent of the initial resource levels x(0) is equivalent, in our setting, to the requirement that the equilibrium is perfect, sometimes called subgame perfect. This excludes equilibria with so-called "incredible threats" whereby players may make extreme, but unrealistic, threats of increased production if another player deviates from a certain path. We refer to [15] and the textbooks [9, 10] for further discussion and references on this issue.
We give an informal motivation for the dynamic programming PDEs we shall use to construct Nash equilibria for these problems. First, consider any continuous Markov strategy {q j (x(t)) | t ≥ 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ N}, and the profits starting at time s ≥ 0:
Let x = x(0) denote any interior point (x j > 0, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n), so all players start with some initial reserves. 4 Then, differentiating (20) with respect to s and setting s = 0 gives the partial differential equation
which can be re-written as
Then Bellman-principle arguments 5 reduce each player's optimization problem to a local optimization, and the search for a Markov perfect equilibrium to a search for a local static Nash equilibrium, which, in this case, amounts to optimizing π in (22) with respect to its first argument, with the second argument fixed at the other players' equilibrium strategies. Writing v i = vq * i for the value functions using the equilibrium policies:
we have
where x ∈ R N + with x j > 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ N, that is when all players have some reserve of the traditional resource.
We assume throughout that each v i is continuously differentiable up to the axes:
We observe from (23) that ∂v i ∂x i enters as a "shadow cost" for player i at the differential level. The interpretation as a cost is legitimate as we naturally expect ∂v i ∂x i ≥ 0: adding more reserves increases the value function. 4 The boundary cases when some x j = 0 are dealt with in Section 3.2. 5 See, for instance, [16] , [8 Comparison with (2) reveals the differential Nash equilibrium problem in the PDEs is just the one-period game with the role of the costs a i played by the partial derivatives ∂v i /∂x i . For a fixed x ∈ R N + , if there is a unique Nash equilibrium q * (a) for the static game with
then we re-write equations (23) as
where we define
and recall that
is equilibrium profit function of the static game. The equilibrium production rates of the exhaustible resource at time t are given byq *
Note that the definition of Nash equilibrium and the constructions of q * i (a) and G i (a) in Propositions 2.6 and 2.10 take care of the fact that not all players may participate at all resource levels x, depending on the vector of shadow costs a = Dv(x) at that point. However they encompass the fact that there are always potentially N active players. For the majority of the paper, we shall treat the cases where all players participate, but we shall discuss the situation where one player may be blockaded in the two-player dynamic game in Section 5.
At this level of generality, we are not able to provide reasonable conditions for existence and uniqueness of a solution to the system (24), equipped with appropriate boundary conditions discussed in the following section, let alone solutions with sufficient regularity to generate a unique Nash equilibrium with well-behaved strategies. We will proceed by staying relatively close to a case which is well-understood. In the next section, we address the issue of exhaustibility and boundary conditions.
Exhaustibility
When a player has exhausted his reserves of the cheap resource, he can turn to the alternative means of production which, while more costly than the original one, allows the exhausted player to remain in the game, but in a disadvantaged position. In the energy example, there are alternative "backstop" technologies, such as solar power or steam-extracted oil shales, that an energy supplier may resort to when his reserves of oil run out, both of which are more expensive than delivering energy by extracting oil.
We consider the case x i = 0, when player i has exhausted his supply. Then we have
Similarly, the HJ equation
These are then a system of N equations on the hyperplane x i = 0 involving only partial derivatives along the plane. We can proceed similarly to the cases in which more and more players have exhausted their reserves until we reach the fully exhausted case. Here, all the players are using the inexhaustible alternative resource, and so produce at the constant rate q * i (c1), where 1 denotes the N-vector of ones. It follows that the value functions are just the constant
This serves as the initial condition for the one-player ODEs on the lines. Once solved, these are axis Dirichlet boundary conditions for the two-player PDEs on the planes, and so on. Now if the value functions are found to satisfy
then our initial hypothesis, that no producer will use the alternative technology while the cheaper one is available, will be validated. This is clear because if we introduced additional control variables in the interior so that each player could choose both a quantity from reserves and a quantity from the alternative source, then in each game at the differential level, none would be produced from the alternative as long as the shadow cost
is smaller than c. This is indeed the case for the approximate solutions in Section 4.2, and the numerical solutions of Section 5.3, and we shall assume it to be the case for the remainder of the paper.
Neumann Boundary Conditions
When all players participate at all resource levels, it is possible to replace the Dirichlet boundary conditions coming from (26) by simpler Neumann boundary conditions. We reiterate that the Dirichlet conditions for the value functions are found by solving the chain of games starting with the case of all players exhausted, then the game where one has reserves and N − 1 players are using the alternative technology, up to N − 1 with reserves and one using the alternative.
Recall that we have assumed that we have continuity of the first derivatives of the value functions up to the boundaries and continuity of the equilibrium policiesq * i (x) at all x ∈ R N + .
Fix 1 ≤ i ≤ N and a point x ∈ R N + with all x j > 0, and letx denote the projection of x onto {x i = 0}. For player i, his equilibrium production on x i = 0 is given bȳ
whereas in the interior it is
From continuity ofq *
then we can conclude that
The interpretation of this expression is that, on hitting the boundary x i = 0, the shadow cost of player i turns into the real cost c. As long as player i participates in the game on x i = 0, then we have the Neumann boundary condition (28).
Comparison of (26) with (24), which we re-write as
provided q * i (D −i v) = 0. Therefore, as long as player i still participates in the game on x i = 0, when he is forced to use the alternative technology, the shadow cost of the other players is zero.
Indeed, when the cost c is small enough, all players will participate at all resource levels. For example, in the case of the constant prudence price curves of Section 2.2, we need only consider the extreme case where there are N − 1 producers with the minimum unit cost of zero, and one with the maximum possible unit cost c. If ρ ∈ [N, N + 1), then only a full N-player Nash equilibrium is possible. As the candidate market price from (17) is
since 0 < N + 1 − ρ ≤ 1, all players participate in this case for any c < ∞. In the case ρ < N, the candidate market price
so all players participate if c is smaller than this bound. In the case c = 0, the system (24) with Neumann boundary conditions (28)-(29) has the constant solution
This corresponds to both the alternative and traditional technologies having zero cost of production, so supplies are inexhaustible, and players produce at the same constant rate q * i (0), which corresponds to the static game being played repeatedly. This, of course, is the inexhautible limiting case, since the alternative technology is also costless and so the resource is effectively in infinite supply. The static zero-cost game is played repeatedly and
In Section 4.2, we develop an approximation for small c > 0. We remark that the inexhaustible limit (31) is also the behaviour for large discounting rate r or large resources. Indeed if we write the value functions as v i (x; r) to stress the discount rate, it is easy to check from the PDEs (24) and boundary conditions (28) and (29), that v i (x; r) = 1 r v i (rx; 1), so formal asymptotics in the limits of large (or small) r or ||x|| are analogous calculations.
Small Exhaustibility Approximation
When c is small, we are close to the inexhaustible game played repeatedly, and we may expect that all players participate at all resource levels. In preparation for an approximation in this case for the dynamic game, we first analyze the effect of small-costs on the static game.
Static Game Small Cost Perturbation
We return to the static game, whose Nash optimal strategies are given by q * i (a), and equilibrium profits are
where Q * satisfies (7). We assume costs a are such that all players participate in the equilibrium and the q * i (a) (and hence the G i (a)) are differentiable. A small costs Taylor expansion gives
where we define the constants
which are independent of i and j. Similarly, the strategies are given approximately by
which are again independent of i and j. Further, we define the constant of relative prudence at the zero cost equilibrium solution by
which is just ρ(Nγ), where ρ(q) was defined in (4). Then we have the following expressions for (A, B, λ, µ) in terms of (γ, ρ 0 , P ′ (Nγ)).
Proposition 4.1. We assume ρ 0 < (N + 1). The perturbation coefficients (A, B, λ, µ) can be expressed as
Proof. Let θ = λ + (N − 1)µ. Differentiating the summed first-order conditions (7) with respect to a i and setting a = 0 gives
Differentiating (6) with respect to a i and setting a = 0 gives
Re-arranging leads to (39) and (40).
Next, differentiating (32) with respect to a i and setting a = 0 gives
But, from (7) with A N = j a j = 0, we have P (Nγ) = −γP ′ (Nγ). Therefore,
and (37) follows after substituting from (40). Similarly, differentiating (32) with respect to a j (j = i) and setting a = 0 gives
and (38) follows after substitution for θ and µ.
We comment that since ρ 0 < (N + 1) (and N ≥ 2), the formulas (38-40) imply that B > 0, and λ < 0,
while (37) implies that
and A > 0 otherwise. Formula (40) yields µ ≥ 0 for ρ 0 ≤ N, and µ < 0 otherwise. In other words, player i's profits increase when any other player's cost a j is increased from zero, and he also increases his production for ρ 0 ≤ N. When his own cost a i is increased from zero, he decreases his production, but his profit may increase or decrease depending on ρ 0 . Finally, if costs for all the players are increased by the same amount, a i = c, ∀i, then
so each player's equilibrium profit increases with cost according to the sign of A + (N − 1)B. From (37) and (38), we have
so profits actually increase with costs for ρ 0 > 2, suggesting that sufficient curvature induces a degree of mutually beneficial production. Similarly, the optimal production quantities under a symmetric increase in costs are approximated as
From (39) and (40),
so each player's equilibrium production decreases with an across-the-board cost increase.
Differential Game Small Cost Perturbation
We look for an approximate solution of (24), with boundary conditions (28)-(29), of the form
for some functions v
(1) i to be found. Inserting the expansion into the PDEs and boundary conditions leads to the linearized system A ∂v
where (A, B, γ) were defined in (33) and (35). We have the following explicit solution.
Proposition 4.2. Assume that
Then the small exhaustibility corrections to the value functions are given by 
Proof. We make the additively separable ansatz:
for some functions f and g, and the solution follows immediately from (44)-(46). The assumption ρ 0 < 2N 2 /(2N − 1) guarantees that A < 0 from (42). Therefore, the terms in (48) go to zero at large resource levels, corresponding to the inexhaustible limit.
It follows from (34) with the replacements
that the optimal strategies under small exhaustibility are approximated by
Time to Exhaustion in the Symmetric Game
When there is a small cost of alternative technology c, the resource levels x i (t) diminish according to the approximate dynamics
In the symmetric game, when the initial reserves are equal,
, where x(t) solves
The solution is given by
We compute the time t f when resources run out, namely x(t f ) = 0. When there is no alternative technology (c = 0), the inexhaustible game is played repeatedly with constant production rate γ. In this case, the time to use x 0 units is simply x 0 /γ. When c > 0 but is small, it follows from (51) that
This formula is illustrated in Figure 1 using parameter values for (γ, A, λ, µ) corresponding to the pricing curves (16) of constant ρ. Note that, for relatively small c, the effect of exhaustibility is to slow down extraction, with diminishing effect as ρ 0 increases (left panel). The effect becomes smaller as N increases (right).
Illustration: Duopoly
We illustrate the effects of exhaustibility using the two-player duopoly problem. The use of asymptotic expansions used to analyze equilibria for differential games is not common, but we mention [3] which studied a very different kind of duopoly model with small parameter approximations. When N = 2, we shall use the notation
The system of equations (24) are then
with exhaustibility boundary conditions and we use subscripts for partial derivatives.
Our expansion in small c is denoted 
and w (1) (x, y) = v (1) (y, x). Recall that γ = q * 1 (0, 0) = q * 2 (0, 0), the optimal extraction rate of the zero-cost stage game, and the correction term depends on
the constant of relative prudence, via the relations (37)-(38), which here are
We assume the restriction (47) in Proposition 4.2, namely ρ 0 < 
From (41), we know λ < 0 for all admissible ρ 0 , and µ ≤ 0 for ρ 0 ≥ N = 2. In this case, production rates decrease at all resource levels (x, y) under the introduction of exhaustibility. In the case ρ 0 < N = 2, player 1's production rate increases when x > y + I,
Similarly, player 2 increases his production over the inexhaustible rate when y > x + I. We have I > 0 if −λ > µ which, from (43), is always the case when ρ 0 < N. Therefore, there are regions of increased and decreased production. Since I measures the width of the band in which production is decreased with the introduction of small exhaustibility, we see it is proportional to the inexhaustible production rate γ. To understand the dependence on the curvature coefficient ρ 0 , we consider the pricing functions (16) with constant prudence ρ < 2. We fix η = 1 so that for ρ < 1, when there is a finite choke price, it is given by P (0) = (1 − ρ) −1 . Recall that in all cases, η is the finite saturation point where P (η) = 0 and P ′ (η) = −1. Then it is easy to compute Figure 2 (right) shows how the width of the band in which both players slow down production relative to their inexhaustible rates increases (to infinity) with ρ. Figure 3 shows the quantities (x, y) where v (1) and/or w (1) are positive for two different constant ρ pricing functions. Notice that introduction of some exhaustibility (small c > 0) can improve a firm's lifetime profit compared to the inexhaustible case, even when it is behind in resources. In other words, even in some part of {x < y}, player 1's overall profit can increase because the exhaustibility affects player 2 as well. However, once x and y are small enough, both value functions decrease. Finally, we illustrate the evolution of two asymmetric games with different constant ρ pricing functions: ρ 1 = 0 and ρ 2 = 1.5. Using the formula (59) to compute γ, and then (57) and (58) for the parameters (A, B, λ, µ) that show up in the asymptotic approximations, we run the games in which the initial resource levels are (x(0), y(0)) = (5, 2) and cost of the alternative technology is c = 0.25, using the approximate dynamics (50). The game paths are shown in Figure 4 ; the production rates and the ensuing market price are shown in Figure 5 .
Duopoly Extraction Problem with the Linear Pricing Function
We now concentrate on a more detailed examination of the two-player game for the linear pricing function P (Q) = 1 − Q, and we no longer assume that c is small, but of course we do still assume that c < P (0 + ) = 1. We use the notation for the two-player dynamic game introduced in Section 4.4, and clearly, by symmetry, we have w(x, y) = v(y, x). We maintain our standing assumption that the value functions v and w are continuously differentiable up to the axes with v x , w y < c in the interior {(x, y) | x > 0, y > 0}, so neither player would want to produce from the alternative technology while traditional supplies remain. Our numerical experiments (Section 5.3) suggest that the latter bound is obeyed, and switching in the interior does not occur. When both players have resources left, the candidate strategies are
Clearly for c ≤ , and v x , w y < c, we have q * 1 , q * 2 > 0, and both players participate in the interior. In this case, the partial differential equations in {(x, y) | x > 0, y > 0} are 1 9 (
However, for larger costs of the alternative technology ( 1 2 < c < 1), one player could in principle have a large enough shadow cost, that he would be better off not producing for a while and waiting for his competitor to run down some more of his resources. For the duopoly problem, this would mean that, while he was blockaded, the other player would have a monopoly, at least temporarily.
In Section 5.1, we study the reduced game on the axes, when one player is using the inexhaustible alternative technology and the value functions satisfy ordinary differential equations. We establish some specific conditions under which blockading occurs on the axes. We then make some remarks on the mathematical properties of the partial differential equations (which are highly nonstandard) and describe their numerical solution in the case without blockading. Analysis of the blockading case in the interior is beyond the scope of the current paper, and Section 5.2 describes the sort of complications that might arise.
The Axis Game & Blockading
When one player exhausts his resources, we can compute the value function, strategies and blockade regions explicitly. We state the results on y = 0 where player two has exhausted his reserves and may produce from the alternative inexhaustible source at cost c; the results for the axis game on x = 0 follows analogously from symmetry. The equations for v(x, 0) and w(x, 0) in the reduced game are (25) and (26), which here are
where v ′ = v x (x, 0) and w ′ = w x (x, 0). If there is no blockading at x, we have
and these ODEs have initial condition (27), specifically v(0, 0) = w(0, 0) = (1 − c) 2 /(9r). Comparison of (61) and (62) along with the assumed continuity of the first derivatives of the value functions up to the axes led to the Neumann boundary conditions (55). However we will not use the Neumann conditions as we analyze the transition to the blockading case, since they do not apply there. If player two is blockaded at some x > 0, we have q * 2 = 0, and
Proposition 5.1. For the linear pricing function P (Q) = 1 − Q, and for c ≤ , there is no blockading when one player has exhausted his resources. On y = 0, the value function v(x, 0) for the player with resources is implicitly given by
It is concave, increasing and
The value function w(x, 0) of the other player is given explicitly by
Proof. From (62), we have
Integrating leads to the transcendental equation φ(z) = e −θx , where θ = 9r/4(1 + c),
and the solution to the ODE is v(x, 0) = z 2 . Since it can be shown that φ is decreasing for z ≥ 0 and
it follows that, given x > 0, the equation
), which leads to the formula (64). From (66), we see v ′ > 0. Differentiating the ODE gives
for x > 0, so the production rates q * 1 , q * 2 > 0, and there is no blockading. The limit x → ∞ is easy to calculate.
Lastly, the second equation in (62) is readily solved by using v ′ as the independent variable. , blockading occurs on y = 0 for x ≥ x b , where
The value functions v(x, 0) and w(x, 0) are given by (64) and (65) for 0 ≤ x < x b , and, for
Proof. Using the no-blockade solution (64) in the formula
shows that q * . The value functions and strategies on the axis in a case with blockading are illustrated in Figure 6 . We note also that x b is decreasing in c, and x b ↓ 0 as c ↑ 1, so the region in which player 2 is discouraged from participating with the alternative technology increases with the cost of that technology, as we would expect (see Figure 8) . Formally, the limit c = 1 corresponds to the model where player 1 has a total monopoly when player 2 has exhausted his resources, and vice versa. In Figure 7 , we show the game trajectory and corresponding production rates and market price for c = 0.7 as firm two is initially blockaded and then re-enters with the alternative technology once firm one has sufficiently run down his reserves. We observe that when player one's reserves reach x b , his monopoly becomes a duopoly again and the rate of increase of the market price slows dramatically.
Finally in this section, we give the formulas when player one has infinite resources, while player two has a finite resource y. The ODEs at x = +∞ are obtained by setting all x derivatives to zero. The ODEs for W (y) = w(∞, y) and V (y) = v(∞, y) are
As usual, there are two cases either side of c = , x b = ∞, we will here put that case under blockading.
No blockading. For c < 1 2 , the boundary conditions at y = 0 are V = (1 + c) 2 /(9r), W = (1 − 2c) 2 /(9r). Then, as before, we solve to find
and, with
Both V and W tend to 1/(9r) as y → ∞ (ξ → 0).
With blockading. For c ≥ 1 2 , the equations are the same but the initial conditions are V = 1/(4r) (the large-x behaviour of the monopoly solution on the x axis), W = 0. The solutions are −3 √ rW − log 1 − 3 √ rW = 9ry 4 ,
We note that they are independent of c and they agree with the previous case when c = (1 − 2W ′ ) = √ rW , the solution W > 0 for y > 0 implies there is no blockading in the interior on x = ∞. This is not surprising since player two is so very far from being un-blockaded once he runs out, he has no incentive to hang on to reserves.
Type of the PDEs
With their full quadratic nonlinearity, the coupled HJ equations (61) are highly nonstandard. The middle terms, involving v y in the first equation and w x in the second, describe the impact of one player's resource level on the other's value function. These externality terms are intrinsic to PDE systems arising from game problems, and contribute significantly to their complexity. Despite the full nonlinearity of the PDEs, it is helpful to consider their general behaviour along the lines of the standard elliptic/parabolic/hyperbolic classification of quasilinear second-order equations in two variables.
The PDEs are conveniently written as
where we have dropped the stars on the optimal strategies, and we use the shorthand
We are assuming a solution with continuous first derivatives, but we enquire whether it is possible for the second derivatives v xx etc. to have a jump [v xx ] etc. across a curve y = y(x). This is a standard approach for a quasilinear system. We call the system hyperbolic if there are two nontrivial 6 such directions hyperbolic, while with no real directions it is elliptic, and parabolic with coincident roots.
Suppose 
These homogeneous equations only have a solution if the determinant of coefficients vanishes:
The third and fourth columns can be removed with the second and fourth rows (they give two spurious roots due to differentiation) and after some manipulation and replacement of the α i we arrive at
the number of real roots of which determines the type at each point. As expected for a quasilinear system (let alone a fully nonlinear one), the determination of type depends on the solution itself, and this places severe restrictions on what we are able to say with certainty.
Large x and y. When both x and y tend to infinity, the derivatives of v and w tend to zero and the strategies q 1 and q 2 both tend to . Thus (71) becomes 4λ 2 − 7λ + 4 = 0, which has complex roots. Hence the system is elliptic in this region. 7 Other combinations of derivatives give the same result. 
Numerical Solutions
Numerical discretization of the system (61) is highly non-trivial given the complexity of the equations. Moreover, the change of type outlined above, for 1 2 < c < 1, is an enormous complication. Hence we limit our numerical illustrations to the case 0 < c ≤ . While we do not go into the full details of our approach here, features of the method we have used and found to be effective are:
• Solve for the steady state of the time-dependent stochastic analogue of the differential game, namely add a small Laplacian term to the equations to eliminate grid-scale oscillations and obtain solutions with smooth (non-oscillatory) first derivatives, and hence optimal strategies. All approaches that did not use this regularization were found, without exception, to exhibit instabilities. This involves discretizing
and the analogue for the w equation, for a small diffusion coefficient ε of size O(∆x), where ∆x is the typical grid size, and to large time t. The error is still measured with the residual of the original equations. In practice, we use an explicit time-stepping method, and we work with the scalar equation derived by substituting the non-local term w(x, y) = v(y, x) and similarly for the derivatives.
• We subtract off the two-term asymptotic approximation v =
is given by (56), to solve for the residual.
• We use a non-uniform grid to put more resolution near the axes. We use standard central finite-differences, with higher-order one-sided difference at the axes for the Neumann boundary conditions (55), and zero Neumann conditions at the far edges of the computational grid .
Although this method is slow, our numerical experiments indicate convergence at a rate O(∆x 2/3 ). This is illustrated in Figure 9 , showing the log-error decreasing with the number of grid points on a domain 0 < x, y < 5. (The inf norm of the error in the boundary values on the axes, which can be checked against the exact solution of the ODEs in Proposition 5.1, shows similar convergence behaviour.) Numerically, we solve for the value functions (v, w) and check the shadow costs (v x , w y ) (from finite differencing) do not exceed c. Throughout, we set r = 1. Figure 10 (left) shows the computed v(x, y) surface for c = 0.5, and Figure 11 (left) shows the computed v x (x, y) surface. The shadow cost for player 1 increases up to c at x = 0. The right panel shows player 1's optimal strategy as a function of resource levels. Figure 10 (right) compares the game paths, starting at (5, 2), when there is a small cost c = 0.05 and a much larger one c = 0.5. Figure 12 shows how shadow costs, production rates and the market price evolve over the course of the dynamic game. Even though initially player 2 drops production and player 1 increases production, the price for the consumer always rises, with particularly sharp increases as each player approaches exhaustion. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have initiated a study of Cournot differential games as applied to problems of exhaustible resources. These are characterized by systems of first-order nonlinear PDEs which may, in certain parameter regimes, be of mixed type. As with most nonzero-sum games in continuous time, existence, uniqueness and regularity of value functions remain very difficult open issues, while numerical solutions also pose a major challenge.
Our analysis so far has focused on the case where the cost of the alternative inexhaustible technology is not too large, and there is no blockading. Here we are able to construct asymptotic and numerical approximations that provide quantitative insight into how exhaustibility may affect production and prices in a Cournot market. For example, Figure 2 demonstrates that if producers alter their production to account for diminishing resources far enough in advance, their overall lifetime profits may actually increase.
The regime where the cost of the alternative resource is relatively high introduces the issue of some firms potentially being temporarily priced out of production by the dominance of others. We are able to study the reduced two-player game in this regime when one player has exhausted his traditional resources. The effect of his re-entry, when the monopoly becomes a duopoly again, is to slow the rise in prices as illustrated in Figure 7 . The issue of blockading in the interior remains a numerical challenge we are pursuing.
There are many related problems and extensions of the current work we plan to consider. Uncertain and fluctuating price functions or cost structures lead to dynamic games played in a random environment. Costs may vary with resources remaining or past production, to model industries where learning-by-doing can cause costs to drop with experience. Stochastic differential games, where inventory levels are estimated with uncertainty (for example due to noisy seismic estimates of oil reserves) may lead to PDE problems whose numerical solution is simpler than for the corresponding ordinary differential game, for example if the noise sources are Brownian motions, adding a strongly elliptic second-order term to the PDEs. Such benefits may also be gained by considering problems over finite time horizons.
A structurally similar type of PDE problem to the ones considered here arises for Bertrand competitions [2] in which firms set prices and the market determines demand quantities. The framework could also be adapted to Kreps-Scheinkman competitions [14] in which firms first play a Cournot game to set quantity pre-commitments, and then play a Bertrand game to set prices and delivery amounts. Different markets lend themselves to different models of oligopolistic competition. For example, markets for consumer goods may best be described by Bertrand competition, whereas a Cournot model may be more suitable for commodities markets.
In terms of energy production and renewable resources, a major policy issue is how governments can impose costs or taxes to encourage (or nudge) firms to partially produce from greener technologies before oil has run out. This can be viewed as an inverse problem for a dynamic game in which a cost function (c(x, y) in the two-player notation) incorporating a tax is imposed to force partial conversion to, say, solar energy in the interior. Design of such a regulatory structure to generate environmentally attractive Nash equilibria from profit-maximizing firms will rely on good numerical algorithms for the forward problem. Robustness to choice of the discount rate r and the price curve is another difficult and interesting area of investigation.
Finally, there are other applications of this type of model where there are choices between different energy sources of different costs and degrees of renewability: the costless product might be hydroelectricity (the resource level being the reserve of water) or geothermal energy (limited by the heat capacity of the rock), as opposed to generating electricity from boughtin fossil fuel; or extraction of natural gas compared with generation of gas from coal. In the spirit of Cournot's work on mineral water production, there are interesting problems related to extraction of a limited reservoir of underground water compared with desalination. = ε η λ f n (η) + n ε −1 η 1 λu −(λ+1) P (εu) du.
As P (εu) = P (η) = 0 when u = ε −1 η, putting P = max{P, 0}, we have
Then P (εu) ↑ P (0 + ) = P (0 + ) pointwise as ε ↓ 0. Hence, using
by the monotone convergence theorem. Therefore f n (0 + ) ≥ nP (0 + ) > A n , as required.
